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The Road from Westray:
A Predictable Path to Disaster?

MORE THAN A YEAR HAS PASSED since publicationof The WestrayStory
JusticeK. PeterRichard,Commissioner,
(ReportoftheWestrayMinePublicInquiry,
madescathing
offactaboutthehazardousoperation
ofthe
1997).Thisreport
findings
mineduringitsshortlifeandthefailureofthegovernment
to regulatethisdangerous
These findings
werereceivedfavourably
activity
properly.
by a community
already
awareof thegrimtruthof Westrayfrompriorinvestigative
books and the
reports,
widemediacoveragegiventotheinquiry's76 daysofhearings,
atwhich71 witnesses
aboutthe eventsleadingup to, and following,the
gave oftengrippingtestimony
disaster.1
The passageoftimehasprovidedan opportunity
toreflect
on
moredispassionately
thatreport,
andweaknesses,
andto considermorebroadly
assessingbothitsstrengths
itsimpacton theideologyandpracticeofoccupational
healthandsafetyregulation
in
Nova Scotia.We needto considerthereport'sgeneralinfluence,
ratherthanjust its
effecton minesafety,
economicconditions,
itis doubtful
that
because,undercurrent
newunderground
coal mineswillbe openedin Nova Scotiain theforeseeable
future
andexistingunderground
coal miningin Cape Breton(in anyevent,regulated
bythe
federalgovernment)
is being wound down. Given this context,littlewould be
coal-mineregulation,
accomplishedby reformslimitedto provincialunderground
the
of
the
recommendations
aredirected
to
although overwhelming
majority
Inquiry's
justthisspecificend.
Forthisreason,as important
as theInquiry'sfindings
offactare,itis vitalthatwe
considerthetheoretical
framework
thatimplicitly
informed
JusticeK. Peter
critically
Richard'sreportandhowthatshapedhis analysisofWestrayand,moreimportantly,
hisrecommendations
forthereform
ofoccupational
healthandsafetyregulation.
The
andfeltbythecommunity,
dangeris thatthegenuineoutrageexpressedbythereport,
will be misdirected
into a series of reformsthatmay allow the conditionsthat
anddisastrously
elsewhere.
producedWestrayto be tragically
reproduced
condemnedthepracticesof
Rarelyhas an inquiryintoa disasterso vehemently
1 Thebroad
outline
ofthepattern
ofcorporate
recklessness
andgovernment
inaction
wasrevealed
in •
released
within
weeks
ofthedisaster.
Attherisk
ofappearing
immodest,
press
reports
mycolleague
Glasbeek
andI were
abletopiecemuch
ofthis
ina working
sixmonths
released
Harry
together
paper
after
thedisaster.
Glasbeek
andEricTucker,
"Death
TheWestray
(York
Harry
byConsensus:
Story"
Centre
for
Research
onWork
andSociety,
No.3,November
Series,
1992),
University,
Working
Paper
inDavidFrank
andGregory
andWorking-Class
inAtlantic
eds.,Labour
reprinted
Kealey,
History
Canada:
AReader
AlsoseeShaun
TheWestray
(St.John's,
Cornish,
1996).
(Halifax,
1993)
Tragedy
andDeanJobb,
Calculated
Risk
1994).
(Halifax,
Eric Tucker,"The Road to Westray:A PredictablePathto Disaster?",Acadiensis,
XXVIII, 1 (Autumn1998),pp. 132-139.
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both the privateownersand the government
regulators.Richardfoundthatthe
ofCurraghResources,ownersoftheWestraymine,
management
a disregard
forworkersafety.Westray
...createda workplacethatfostered
either
dismissed
fundamental
management
safetyhazardsforthoseworking
— or
undergroundin themine— includingroof,dust,and gas conditions
addressedtheminadequately....
Westrayis a starkexampleof an operation
whereproduction
demandsviolatedbasic and fundamental
demandsof safe
drive
for
production,
miningpractice....
[Management's
togetherwithits
in
disdainforsafety,
a
role
the
devastation
of
the
played key
Westraymine,
(p. 135)
and
Thisfinding
is amplysupported
by a detailedreviewof themine'sdevelopment
studieswereconductedby a numberof
Althougha numberof feasibility
operation.
would-beinvestors,a mine plan was never fullydeveloped. Instead,Westray
focusedon monetary
concerns,
particularly
obtaining
generousfederaland
developers
oftheprojecttominimize
theirrisk.Theirfiscalrisk
government
financing
provincial
to thenearcompletedisregard
forthepotential
risks
aversionstoodin starkcontrast
thattheprojectposedforthelivesandhealthoftheunderground
miners.
itselfonce the miningoperationbegan.The
This uncaringattitudemanifested
list
failures
on thepartof Westraymanagement.
documents
a
of
Mine
long
report
andinadequately
ventilation
was
andminerswereunderqualified
trained,
supervisors
poorlyplannedand badlyexecuted,methanewas allowedto accumulateat unsafe
levels,coal dust was not treatedto reduceits explosivepotential,and the work
meansto communicate
their
did notprovideminerswithan effective
organization
healthand safetyconcernsand have themaddressed.Indeed,minersweremadeto
thatif theywerenot satisfiedwiththeirworkingconditionstheironly
understand
optionwas to quit(p. 185).
The reportwas unable to determine
conclusivelythe immediatecause of the
in
hours
of
the
9
earlymorning
May 1992,a factthatprovidedprovincial
explosion
an excuseto staythecriminalchargesagainsttheminemanager,
Gerald
prosecutors
Phillips, and the undergroundsupervisor,Roger Parry. But this reason for
discretionis not sustainedby the report'sfindings.The evidence
prosecutorial
in thereportsupportsits theorythata sparkfromthecontinuous
miner
marshalled
a coal dust
ignitedmethaneaccumulatedin themineand thatthisin turntriggered
on the
explosion.Althoughthe reportfoundevidence that the methanometer
continuousmonitorwas tamperedwith(to preventit fromautomatically
shutting
itrejectedtheconclusionthat
downtheminerifmethanelevelsbecamedangerous),
thereport
in anywaycausedtheexplosion(p. 227). Rather,
concluded
thistampering
alloweddangerouslevelsof
thattheexplosionoccurredbecauseminemanagement
coal dustto accumulate,in violationof existingprovincial
methaneand untreated
safetylaws.Had therebeencompliancewiththelaw,therewouldnothavebeensuch
evidenceinthereport
Therewas,then,sufficient
tomakea case
a calamitousdisaster.
ofthemineled tothedisasterandthatthis
thattherecklessandoftenillegaloperation
was,in part,underthecontrolofthetwoaccused.
operation
The reportalso consideredwhyWestraywas able to operatea dangerousminein
law. Richardcataloguedandharshly
condemned
thefailureof
violationofprovincial
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government
regulatorsinvolvedwiththe Westrayprojectto exercisetheirlegal
powersto protectthe miners.Again,Richardbeginsat the top. FormerPremier
Donald Cameron,thememberfortheridingin whichtheWestrayminewas located,
is justlyvilifiedbyRichardforhisrefusaltoacceptanyresponsibility
fortheWestray
disaster.Richardcharacterizes
his testimony,
and thatof otherswho blamedthe
minersfortheexplosion,as "self-serving,
cynicaland simplistic"
(p. 222). Richard
citesCameron'sstatement
that"We enjoythecomfort
ofopinionwithout
discomfort
ofthought"
andthencomments
is as
acidly:"Therecordwillshowthatthisquotation
of
the
evidence
and
voiced
Cameron
as
it
is
of
the
descriptive
opinions
by
testimony
Richarddidnot
givenbymanyotherwitnessesattheInquiry"(pp. 512-13).Although
find direct political interference
with safetyenforcement,
he concluded that
Cameron's"aggressivepursuit
oftheWestrayprojectmayhavesenta messagetothe
thatWestraywas 'special' and oughtto be
bureaucracy,
especiallytheinspectorate,
treated
as such"(p. 514). Finally,he foundthatCameron,in actingagainsttheadvice
of his officials,lacked a clear understanding
of the acceptablelevel of political
thata minister
orcabinetcouldprovidefora projectoroftherelation
between
support
a minister
andhis department
in dealingwithsuchprojects(pp. 521-2).
The two government
most involvedwithWestraywere Natural
departments
Resourcesand Labour.Althoughearlieraccountsof theWestraydisasternotedthat
thegovernment
officialsandagenciesthatreviewedWestray
plansfailedto seriously
considerwhether
coal could be minedsafely,thoseaccountsfailedto notethatthe
provincialMineralResourcesAct requiredtheMinisterof NaturalResourcesto be
satisfied
thata miningprojectwouldbe safebeforeissuinga permit.
In addition,
any
alteration
tothemineplanrequiredadvanceapprovalfromtheminister,
whichwas to
be givenonlyif safetyto life and property
was preserved.The Inquirycarefully
reviewedtherole of NaturalResourcesand foundthatit eithermisunderstood
or
overlookedits overriding
to ensurethatWestray'
s mineplans were
responsibility
safe (p. 401). Moreover,aftertheminebeganoperation,
thedepartment
inherently
probablyknew of unapprovedchanges to the mine plan but failed to ensure
compliancewiththelegislation(p. 448).
The failureof theDepartment
of Labourto enforcetheCoal Mine Protection
Act
and theOccupationalHealthand SafetyAct was widelycommented
on beforethe
andtheevidencegathered
confirmed
whatwe
Inquiry'shearings,
bythecommission
alreadyknew:
The Department
in particular,
of Labour,in general and theinspectorate
was markedly
derelictinmeeting
itsstatutory
at theWestray
responsibilities
mine.(p. 629, emphasisin theoriginal)
The reportfoundthattheinspectors
lackedthetraining
and experienceto perform
theirrole effectively
and thattheyfailed to receive adequate supervisionand
guidance.Inspectionswere always announcedin advance and inspectorswere
them fromhaving open
accompaniedand guided by management,
preventing
communication
with minersand fromseeing or appreciatingthe true state of
of Labourissued,most
underground
Finally,theorderstheDepartment
operations.
those
stone
that
would
have
an explosion,were
notably
requiring
dusting
prevented
notenforced.
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Thesefindings
offactprovidea partialanswertothequestionofwhytheWestray
officialswere
mineexploded:minemanagement
operatedunsafelyand government
leaves
the
But
this
still
lax in exercisingtheirregulatory
questionsof
powers.
open
officials
didnot
and
so
mine
why
dangerously
government
why
management
operated
intervene
to stopsuchunlawfulbehaviour.The answersto thesequestionsare more
fromdocumentary
andoralevidence.Rather,
to derivedirectly
difficult
theydepend,
healthand
ofoccupational
ofthedeterminants
in part,on a theoretical
understanding
we
view
the
"facts"of
the
one
can
conditions
and
of
state
action.
On
hand,
safety
ofsystemic
as aberrational
while,on theother,we can see themas exemplary
Westray
betweenthesetwopositions,as well as a
thereis a continuum
problems.In reality,
problemsaredefined.The problemwith
varietyof waysor levelsat whichsystemic
as aberrational,
itinadequately
thereport
is that,totheextentitdoes notviewWestray
theorizesits systemiccauses.This leads to recommendations
that,even iffollowed,
in healthandsafetyperformance.
maynotproducemajorimprovements
thatexplainsthe
The centraltheoreticalproblemis to develop a framework
dismisses
of occupationalinjury,disease and death.2Richardimplicitly
production
and
micro-economics
that
fields
of
from
within
the
frameworks
psychology
generated
tend to place the individualworkerat the centreof theiranalysis,focusing
and rationalchoice. Indeed,he condemnsthosewho
on personality
respectively
would blame the minersforcausingWestraydue to theircarelessness.He never
and
thatthe minersrationally
considersworthdiscussinga hypothetical
argument
in
in
mine
for
the
risks
the
chose
to
assume
exchange wages.
Westray
voluntarily
and
focusedon theemployer
framework
Whileitis clearthatRichard'stheoretical
of whatshapestheirbehaviouris
thegovernment,
nottheworker,
his understanding
economies
ofriskin capitalist
less obvious.Crucialto anyanalysisoftheproduction
In a competitive
market
is therelationbetweensafetyandprofit.
economy,firmsare
Thereis a systemic
demandtoput
tomaintain
undercontinuous
pressure
profitability.
with
profitsfirst.Of course,in some instancesimprovedsafetywill be consistent
butin othersitwillnot.
maximization,
profit
is less difficult.
Wheresafetypays,thetaskof regulators
Theyneedto convince
Poor
to adhereto certainstandards.
employersthatit is in theirown self-interest
educationand improvedorganizational
then,can be rectified
through
performance,
Workerscan playan advisoryrolein that
and competence.
awareness,commitment
and
their
process.
process,contributing experience knowledgeof theproduction
Wheresafetydoes notpay,some kindof countervailing
pressureis requiredto
ensurethatoccupationalhealthand safetyconditionsdo not fall below socially
of statestandardsis one response;
acceptablelevels. Inspectionand enforcement
The
workers
is
another.
majorproblemwithRichard'sanalysisis thathe
empowering
nevercomesto gripswiththiscrucialproblem.Instead,he triesto makeitdisappear.
ofthereportis telling:
The following
passagefromthefrontispiece
between
Once a mine is open, therebegins the process of trade-off
and safety.Fromthechiefexecutiveofficerto theminerat the
production
workingface,theobjectivemustbe to operatetheminein a mannerthat
seeTheoNichols,
TheSociology
2 Foranexcellent
discussion,
1997).
(London,
ofIndustrial
Injury
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ensuresthepersonalsafetyof theworkerovertheeconomicimperatives
of
increasedproduction.
The twoseemingly
competing
concepts— safetyand
— mustbe so harmonized
thattheycan co-existwithout
production
doing
harmto each other,(p. viii)
Richardseemsto wantit everyway.He beginsby acknowledging
conflictbetween
productionand safety,proceedsto insistthatsafetymustcome first,and then
concludesbyinsisting
thatsafetyandproduction
mustbe madecompatible
so thatthe
conflictevaporates(therebyprecluding,
the
need
to
presumably,
put safetybefore
production).
In thebodyofthereport,
thisambiguity
tendstobe resolvedon thebasisofthelast
— exceptthatit oftengoes one stepfurther.
formulation
Insteadof addressing
the
it implicitly
assumedthatthey
problemof how to harmonizesafetyand production,
Thishas significant
ramifications
forthereport'sanalysisof
alreadyarein harmony.
theproblemandtheprescriptions
thatitoffers.
For example,the Westraystoryis characterized
as one "of incompetence,
of
of bureaucratic
of deceit,of ruthlessness,
of cover-up,
of
mismanagement,
bungling,
Harshwords,indeed,butthe
apathy,of expediency,and of cynicalindifference".
sourceof all thisdeviance,at leastas faras minemanagement
is concerned,
is that
eitherincompetence
or ignorance,[it]lost sightof thebasic tenetof coal
"through
mining:thatsafeminingis goodbusiness"(p. ix). Ifthisis true,one has to assume—
in Pictou
giventhehistoryof death,injuryand disease in thecoal miningindustry
—
and
elsewhere
that
coal
mine
for
some
unknown
have
reason,
County
operators,
beenunusuallyincompetent
and ignorant
in themanagement
oftheiraffairs.
The report'sanalysisof thefailingsof themineinspectors
also tendstowardsa
devianceperspective,
as opposedto seeinga moresystemic
problemwiththewidely
model of regulation.Aside fromthe failingsof
adoptedinternalresponsibility
individualinspectors,
Richardplacedmuchof theblamefortheinspectors'inaction
on theshouldersof JackNoonan,theexecutivedirector
of theOccupationalHealth
and Safety(OHS) Divisionof theDepartment
of Labour.In particular,
it was his
versionof the internalresponsibility
that
"was
a
deterrent
to
system(IRS)
major
effective
enforcement
of thesafetyregulations
to underground
coal mining"
relating
(p. 455).
becauseit emphasizedthe
Accordingto Richard,Noonan's versionwas deficient
in
role
and
inspectors'
persuading,
educating,facilitating assistingthe workplace
forhealthandsafety
partiesto developthecapacityto assumeprimary
responsibility
withtheapproachto theIRS in other
(p. 471). This,thereportsays,is inconsistent
Ontariowhichservedas a modelforRichard'sanalysis.In
provinces,particularly
ofwhichRichardis so critical,
is notradicallydifferent
fact,theNoonanphilosophy,
fromtheversionof theIRS thatis officially
espousedin mostotherjurisdictions,
Ontario.Forexample,Preventing
including
Injuryand Illness,a policypaperissued
of Labourin January1998,states(p. 8) that:"The overall
by theOntarioMinistry
objective of the OHS systemis to improveOHS performance...
by providing
motivation
andsupport
to individualworkplaces
in orderthattheymaybuilda strong
IRS and achieveself-reliance".
is less a matter
ofthegoal,butofthemeansused
Perhapsthecruxofthedifference
toachieveit.TensionshavealwaysaboundedwithintheIRS modelinthisregard,
but
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two in particular
are relevantto thisdiscussion.The firstis over the role of the
externalresponsibility
andemployers
systemin itsrelationto theIRS. Governments
have typicallyfavoureda "gentlepersuasion"approach,in whichthe inspectors
throughthe
encourageand educatethe workplacepartiesto workcooperatively
This
institutions
of the IRS to meet, indeed surpass,regulatory
requirements.
wantto complywiththelaw
approachis justifiedon thebasisthatrationalemployers
do notactas safetypolicewith
because,afterall, safetyis good business.Inspectors
a mandateto detectandinvestigate
andgovernment
uses formal
unlawful
behaviour,
measures
have
enforcement
measuressparingly,
when
less
other,
coercive,
only
aftera workerhas been
failed.Prosecutionis a last resort,onlyto be attempted
seriouslyinjuredorkilledas theresultofa violation.DespiteRichard'sprotestations
werenotinconsistent
withthe
to thecontrary,
theactionsof theWestrayinspectors
mainstream
IRS vision.
themselves
havearguedfor
tradeunionsand,sometimes,
theinspectors
Workers,
a more vigorousapproachto enforcement,
based on the view thatthereare a
withthelaw becausetheydo
numberof employers
whoresistcomplying
significant
to do so. For
notbelieve,at leastin some cases, it is in theirfinancialself-interest
accordingto Richard,the inspectors,
example,in Ontario,the modeljurisdiction
theirunion,formally
through
complainedin 1986thatseniorofficialsin theMinistry
on the
An inquiryexonerated
theministry
of Labourwerethwarting
enforcement.
basis thatits conducthad to be evaluated"on the basis thatthe IRS prevails".3
withthelevelofenforcement
has persisted.
dissatisfaction
Nonetheless,
withintheIRS model.
Richarddoes recognizetheuneasyplace of enforcement
"at leastin the
thelack of emphasison regulation
Indeed,at one point,he identifies
hecondemns
of
the
as
a
weakness
of
the
IRS"
Moreover,
system.
earlystages
(p. 472)
from
its
for
the
to
divert
attention
theprovincial
IRS
responsibilities
inspectors using
of Labour's powersto
includeusingtheDepartment
(p. 477) which,presumably,
is that
ensurethatunsafeconditions
arenotallowedtopersist.Theproblem,
however,
Richard'sacceptanceof theIRS model,andthepremisesthatsupportit,lead himto
of adoptingan "uncompromising
underestimate
thedifficulty
forinspectors
position
on strictcompliance"(p. 605). It is tellingthat Richard makes no specific
of occupationalhealthand
to increasethe level of enforcement
recommendation
safetylaw.
The report,however,does call formoreofficers'and directors'accountability,
underprovincialhealthand safetyand,possibly,federalcriminallaw,forthefailure
evenifit
safeworkplaces(p. 601). Thisis a welcomerecommendation,
to maintain
tackedtotheendoftheReportas a responsetothe
appearsalmostas an afterthought,
briefsubmitted
of America.But it is notclearthatthe
by theUnitedSteelworkers
mainimpediment
to prosecution
is theinadequacyof existinglegislation.
Often,the
officialsto deploy
of law enforcement
chiefstumbling
block is theunwillingness
and managersengagedin the
theseinstruments
officers
directors,
againstcorporate
tend
to
see
in thiscontextas a
of
Government
officials
wrong-doing
pursuit profit.
Health
andSafety
ontheAdministration
3 G.G.McKenzie
andJ.I. Laskin,
oftheOccupational
Report
Act(Ontario,
vol.I,p.xx.
1987),

138 Acadiensis

civil problemforwhichdamagesare theappropriate
remedy,even whenphysical
on thevictims.Forexample,themanufacturers
oftheDalkon
harmhas beeninflicted
shieldand the producersof asbestosproductshave neverbeen chargedwithany
oftheusersoftheirproducts.
offence,
despitetheirrecklessendangerment
a breakfromthis
The prosecutionof Westray,Phillipsand Parryrepresented
butthedecisionoftheprovincial
serviceinJune1998to staythe
prosecution
pattern,
a return
Thejustification
criminalchargesconstituted
to thewell-established
pattern.
thattheyoffered
forthismeasureis hardtosquarewiththemassofevidencecompiled
by Richardshowingthatit was the accumulationof gas and coal dustthatwas
responsiblefor the explosion,even thoughthe source of ignitioncould not be
Moreover,thisrationaleleavesunexplained
whychargeswere
preciselyascertained.
laidinthefirst
and
the
all
the
to
the
place
why government
fought
way
SupremeCourt
of Canada for the rightto reinstatethe chargesafterthe trialjudge stayedthe
becauseof a lackofproperdisclosurebytheCrown.
proceedings
A second pointof conflictwithinthe IRS model concernsthe role of worker
and
participation.
Typically,workersaregivena rightto know,a rightto participate
an individualrightto refuseunsafework.Theirroleis definedas "contributory",
and
In addition,
becausegovernments
view
theyarenotgivendecision-making
authority.
interest,
occupationalhealthand safetyas an area of commonemployer-employee
theyhavenotseentheneedto addressthequestionof imbalancesin powerbetween
workers
andemployers.
relations
are
Indeed,accordingto theIRS model,adversarial
destructiveto the properfunctioningof the systemand should be strongly
Thisviewhas beenchallengedbymanyhealthandsafetyactivists
who
discouraged.4
have arguedthata weaknessof theIRS is thatworkerslack thenecessarypowerto
ensure that employerscomply with theirlegal responsibilities
and to protect
themselves
whenfacedwithunsafeconditions.
Adversarial
strategies,
theyargue,are
sometimesnecessaryin a systemin whichprofitand safetymayconflict.Since the
IRS modelwas firstimplemented,
workers
havefought
to expandtheirpowerwithin
thesystem,
buthavemetwithlimitedsuccess,largelyduetothevociferous
opposition
ofemployers
whohaveresistedconcedingcontroloverproduction.
Richard'sdiscussionoftheseissuesis particularly
disappointing,
especiallygiven
thehistory
of theWestraymineand theinability
thenon-unionized
minersto exert
in
influence
the
is
IRS.
because
constructed
as
Richard
But,
deviant,
any
Westray
does notsee unequalpowerrelationsin theworkplaceas a systemicproblemthat
needsredress.Instead,he adoptstheview thatadversarial
behaviouris pathological
andis causedbytradeunionsusinghealthand safetyissuesto achieveotherends.In
theconfrontational
attitude
supportof thisconclusion,Richardcitesas unacceptable
of unionofficialshe observedat Devco's Phalenminein Cape Breton(p. 568). To
Richardrecommends
isolateoccupationalhealthand safetyfromindustrial
relations,
thatthelegislation
be amendedtoprohibit
a personwhois,orhasbeeninthelastyear,
a memberoftheexecutiveof an employeeorganization
frombeinga memberofthe
4 Report
ontheHealth
andSafety
inMines
M.Ham,
(James
oftheRoyalCommission
ofWorkers
oftheAttorney
Federal
Provincial
Commissioner,
General,
Ontario,
1976);Joint
Ministry
Inquiry
Commission
intoSafety
inMines
andMining
Plants
inOntario,
Towards
(Kevin
SafeProduction
Burkett,
Commissioner,
1981).
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jointhealthandsafetycommittee
(p. 510).
The problemwithRichard'sconclusionis thattheevidencedoes notsupporthis
contention
thatadversarial
Forexample,a studyofjoint
approachesare undesirable.
healthandsafetycommittees
in OntarioandQuebecfoundthat"adversarial
relations
betweenmanagement
and labourformedpartof a factorwhichwas associatedwith
lowerinjuryratesin unionizedworkplaces".5Whatthissuggestsis that,contrary
to
officialwisdom,cooperationin achievinggood occupationalhealthand safety
outcomescannotbe assumed as the normalcondition,derivingfroma natural
ofinterests
andemployers.
Powerandinfluence
matter,
commonality
amongworkers
anda confrontational
attitude
whenfacedwithemployer
resistance.
mightbejustified
Richardrecognizesthis,ifonlypartially
thatthedisaster
andimplicitly,
bysuggesting
of theUnited
mighthavebeen avoidedhad theWestrayminersgainedcertification
Mine Workersof Americaas a resultof the vote held in January1992 (p. 607).
inhisreport
andmakesno recommendations
However,he failstodevelopthisinsight
to strengthen
workerrightsin theIRS.
TheWestray
Storymapsouta pathtodisasterbut,likeall exercisesincartography,
of reality.The routethatRicharddescribesis
providesonlya partialrepresentation
filledwithpeople who exhibita lack of concernforthe safetyof workers:mine
funding;politicianskeen to attract
developersanxious to secure government
in theirridings,but unwillingto be accountablefortheconsequences;
investment
andmotivation
toeffectively
exercisetheir
government
regulators
lackingthetraining
statutory
powerto protectthe public; and mine operatorskeen to producecoal
harsh
whateverthe risk.Richardcriticizesthemall in appropriately
immediately,
Pastcommissions
ofinquiry
havebeenmuch
terms.Forthishe is to be commended.
less forthcoming
in thisregard.
froma flawedsurveyoftheterrain.
Butthemapofwhatwentwrongis constructed
Richarduncritically
conventional
healthand safetywisdom.In
accepts
occupational
his view,thepathto disasterwas causedby a deviationfromtheIRS model;it was
nottheconsequenceof itsnormaloperation.
As a result,despitehisoutrage,Richard
with
the
foundnothingfundamentally
wrong
system.We just have to get back on
hasresulted
ina seriesofrecommendations
track.Thiswayofthinking
aboutWestray
has acceptedwholeheartedly
whichtheNova Scotia government
and promisedto
implement.6
willresultfromtherecommendations
ofJustice
someimprovements
Undoubtedly,
Richard'sreport,
eventhoughithas failedto interrogate
crucialassumptions.
To the
extentthoseassumptions
areflawed,a different
mapof theroadto disasterneedsto
wouldindicatethatthedisaster
be drawn.A moreaccuratemapoftheroadtoWestray
on themain
is notfounddowna sideroad,butthatit was a predictable
destination
highway.The reportwouldhaveus continuedownthisroad,butat whatcostand at
whoseexpense?
ERIC TUCKER
inOntario
"TheImpact
ofJoint
Health
andSafety
Committees
5 Carolyn
andMarcel
Simard,
Tuohy
fortheCanadian
Association
ofAdministrators
ofLabour
andQuebec"
Law,
(a study
prepared
1993).
January
ofNovaScotia,
APlanofAction
6 Westray
December,
(Government
1997).

